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BOOK REVIEWS
JUSTICE: AN

IfismolicAL AND PmLosopmcAT

ESSAY. By Giorgio Del Vecc7io. New York:
Philosophical Library 1953. xxi and 236
pp. $6.00.
The present work presents the central concept of the legal philosophy of a famous European scholar, author of fifty published writings,
including two weighty tomes translated into
English, The Formal Bases of Law (1914), and
Philosophy of Law (1953). The volume before
us, however, contains barely sixty pages of
text; the balance of two hundred twenty-one
pages being largely filled with annotations, in
fine print, illustrating views that parallel, and
contrastwith his own, from Plato to the present.
In view of this monumental conciseness, it will
be necessary, even in a short review, to give an
expanded paraphrase of some thematic sentences, rather than a summary, if we are to
convey something of our author's thesis.
The kernel of Del Vecchio's conception of
justice is found-in what he calls alterifas, or
"the consideration of the Other as a subject."
(p. 77). The inner nature of justice is conceived
as nothing but the inner nature of human consciousness, which is consciousness of the self in
relation to an other-than-the-self. To become
aware of oneself, Del Vecchio says, means not
merely to become aware of a not-self, and therewith of a boundary between what is self and
what is not-self. Of course, human consciousness
necessarily involves the awareness of such a line,
but it involves something more. For the self
cannot define itself, to itself, in a merely negative fashion. It must see itself in another self
like itself. It seems to me that what Del Vecchio
is driving at is well conveyed by the following
lines from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Act I.
Sc. i.
Cas. Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your
face?
Br. No Cassius; for the eye sees not itself,
But by reflection, by some other things.

Cas. Therefore, good Brutus, be prepared to
hear:
And since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by reflection, I, your glass,
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which you yet know not
of.
The individual must, that is, detach himself (in
a sense) from himself, in.order to see himself.
Brutus must see Brutus through the eyes of
Cassius, or he will never see Brutus. In Del
Vecchio's terms, he must see himself as an
Other, in order to see himself as a Self. To see
himself as a self, however, means seeing that
there are other selves, other possessors of subjectivity. Other selves, that is, can never be
mere objects, because realizing the subjectivity
of others is the very condition of one's own subjectivity.
Justice, then, according to Del Vecchio is
nothing but "an objective consciousness of
Self, whereby the subjective self becomes coordinated with other selves," This consciousness
is posited a prioriby the awareness of self. Like
Kant, Del Vecchio admits that the phenomenal
world does not allow us actually to know that
another self exists; it is simply a hypothesis
necessary to self-awareness. But it is a hypothesis so necessary and so convincing that we cannot in fact regard it as illusory.
Del Vecchio's universe of co-ordinated selves
bears a remarkable resemblance to Kant's
kingdom of rational beings, whom we must
treat as ends-in-themselves because of their
absolute w .. th as possessors of good wills. Del
Vecchio, in Kantian vein, speaks of "the person
... (as) abstract entity... (as) substance
furnished with autonomy." Man, however, as
distinct from "substance furnished with autonomy," is this person considered "in his actual
modes of behavior." The abstract character of
justice requires that we consider each person as
a fungible entity, i.e. as equal to every other
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person because of his absolute worth. But in
practical terms, justice requires that we evaluate the actions of others by the criterion of
their respect for the absolute worth of the
person. Substantially, these evaluations seem
to result from asking whether the actions could
have been in conformity with Kant's categorical imperative. Del Vecchio does, however, appear to differ somewhat from Kant. Although
the punishment of offenders seems to be directed
towards what Kant would call the removal of
heteronomy from the will, so as to allow the
person punished to act hereafter in accordance
with the autonomy of his "real" will, Del Vecchio would seem to sanction a kind of Aristotelian prudence both in the prevention and
the cure of criminality. Punishment, however,
must never be of such a kind as to violate the
dignity of the person, which is as inviolable in
the criminal as in the saint.
Del Vecchio's argument concerning the
nature of justice is a resolute reaffirmation of
philosophic absolutism, as aginast the pervasive
relativism of the twentieth century. Although
predominantly Kantian, it is an attempt to supply the defects of the purely formal Kantian
ethics with elements of the scholastic and
Aristotelian tradition, instead of going "forward" along the path marked out by Hegel and
his successors. Del Vecchio's attempt deserves
the greatest respect, but one cannot help wondering whether Kant was not a better judge of
the limits of a formal ethics. For Del Vecchio is
Kantian in the purely formal character of the
abstract system of co-ordinated selves which is
his ultimate norm. Yet he is Aristotelian, in that
the awareness of justice springs from a movement within the soul in virtue of which it attains consciousness. Yet consciousness, in the
Aristotelian-scholastic psychology, is conceived
ultimately as understanding, i.e. self-consciousness in the strict sense is identical with selfknowledge. And self-knowledge, like all knovledge, means knowledge of the natures of
things, i.e. knowledge of the intelligible necessity which constitutes the cause or causes of all
things. Now is it precisely this kind of knowledge which Kant rejected as an impossibility.
But it is difficult to see why consciousness
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should be regarded as good, and therewith the
cause of a sense of obligation or duty. In fact, it
seems to me, Del Vecchio supplies consciousness
with a content from "experience," which is
eventually indistinguishable from "historical
experience." Whereas Aristotle would say that
justice depends upon friendship, and friendship
means, ultimately, partnership in the quest
for eternal verities, Del Vecchio says that
justice depends upon self-consciousness, and
self-consciousness upon recognizing the subjectivity of others. However, the impulse to
self-consciousness seems to come from the impulse to become conscious of the experiences we
can share with others by recognizing the
"rights" of others. "If this reading of Del Vecchio is correct, his argument is enclosed within
a circle, and does not actually supply a transcendental norm by which to judge the justice or
injustice of collective historical action. In
short, it seems to me that Del Vecchio is exposed to all the objections that have been made
to Kant and Hegel, and which have led to the
relativism and historicism against which his
work is a protest."
HARRY V. JAFFA

Ohio State University
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY. A STUDY IN THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY Or EMBEZZLEMENT. By

Donald R. Cressey, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1953, pp. 191. $3.00.
In Other People's Money, Donald Cressey propounds his theory of the social psychology of
embezzlement, from the vantage point of
thorough orientation in the literature on criminology, legal formulations, and first-hand case
studies. The materials for the volume were collected by him and his staff at the Illinois States
Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, the United States
Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, and the
California Institution for Men at Chino, California.
Cressey abandons legal concepts of embezzlement and develops two criteria for classifying a
person as an embezzler in this study: (1) The
person must have accepted a position of trust
in good faith, and (2) he must have violated the
trust by committing a crime.
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According to Cressey's theory, trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive
of themselves as having a financial problem
which is non-shareable. This concept is a central
factor throughout the book. Although nonshareable problems precede criminal violations
of financial trust, many different situations produce these problems, all are related to statusseeking, or status-maintaining behavior. Conditions or problems are significant in explaining
a criminal trust violation only if they produce a
non-shareable financial problem for the trusted
person.
Merely having a non-shareable problem, however, is not enough to explain the trust violation. Mr. Cressey's investigation attributes the
violation of a trust not to a single event, but
rather to a series of events or a process. There
must be a "conjecture of events" including the
non-shareable financial problem, the opportunity to violate the trust, and the skills and
rationalizations necessary to complete the act.
Rationalizations, in the sense Cressey uses the
term, means that the trust violator must arrive
at a state of mind which will enable him to
violate the trust and, at the same time, to look
upon himself as a non-violator and in no sense a
''criminal".
Most of the literature on criminology, Cressey
points out, has developed as a by-product of
attempts to apprehend, control or reform the
embezzler. He finds this literature full of crude
concepts and imperfect methods, and makes
clear his desire to be a "pure scientist." The assumptions on which he states his research is
based "are that a scientist must seek to formulate generalizations which permit the discernment of exceptions, thus making possible the
perfecting or refinement of the generalizations.
... The theory which we have presented," he
concludes, "has few practical implications either
for prevention and detection of trust violation
or fortreatment of apprehended offenders." He
hopes that although his theory is at present in
conclusive, it will be tested further by other
investigators and revised in the light of exceptions to his theory.
It would be difficult to determine, through
study of Cressey's book, a method for checking

the material he has collected. He presents no
carefully worked out statement of methodology
or detailed case material. The "cases" he offers
are merely paragraph comments. Thus his
report contributes little if anything new to
methodology.
Mr. Cressey is to be commended for his objectivity toward an important social problem,
for his restraint in reaching conclusions, and
for his flexibility in revising his point of view in
the light of new facts. Too many professional
workers, including judges and probation officers,
give little attention to critical appraisal of either
their clinical work or the complexities of the
social problems with which they deal.
The further testing of Cressey's theory,
which he invites, should not be considered the
exclusive province of the "pure scientist,"-the
researcher. To verbalize like a physical scientist
when discussing the complexities of human
problems, is confusing. The trained and skilled
practitioner, imbued with a scientific attitude,
is in a more favorable position to contribute
to fact-finding and critical analyses, given the
time for proper recording, than many researcher specialists. If Cressey's work can
stimulate a desire in those who handle our criminal population to learn while "treating," his
efforts will not be in vain.
Other People's Money is a provocative document. Your reviewer enthusiastically recommends it, not only to social investigators but to
judges, social workers, probation officers, clergymen or to any layman seeking light on an important social problem.
If the book had begun with the chapter on
"The Role of the Non-Shareable Problem in
Trust Violation" and the material in the
present Introduction and Section I put in an
appendix, it would have been more readable.
JESSE A. JAcoBs
Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry
Chicago, Illinois
MENTAL DISORDER AS A ClumiAL DEFENSE.
By Henry Weihofen. Dennis & Co., Inc.,
Buffalo, New York. 1954. Pp. 530. $20.00.
Readers familiar with the parent work (In.sanity as a Defense in Criminal Law-1933)
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will be surprised and pleased at the vastly
increased scope and sharply contemporary
nature of the present volume, which is much
more than a revision of the original material.
It is a sound and thoughtful attempt to compare, contrast, and integrate the concepts and
procedures of psychiatry and law. The breadth
of content and wealth of factual material of
pinpoint specificity are approached in very systematic fashion, so that the volume is valuable
both for its exposition and as a reference book.
The types of mental disorder occupy the first
section of the book in order to familiarize nonmedical readers with the terminology used in
further sections. In particular, treatment of the
portion on the "Psychopathic Personality" is
excellent since it leans away from the somewhat
archaic theory of constitution, although the
statement that the behavior of the psychopath
is not "purposeful" is somewhat misleading. It
is pointed out that this group of individuals is
the largest single offender of our social codes,
but the point is not made clear that in no state
are they considered legally ill, while they are
considered psychiatrically, psychologically, and
medically ill, and hence occupy a position which
makes for extreme difficulty in removing such
a burden from society.
The next section concerns itself with the historical development of legal tests of irresponsibility and their present status. However much
one may be displeased with the contemporary
tests used, this material is thoroughly covered
and presented in unbiased fashion.
A valuable section follows on disorders which
either do not fall within the law, or which are
"borderline" cases. Here again the case of the
sexual psychopath is taken up and legislative
procedures discussed which are in existence in a
number of states. But, again the point is missed
that relatively few psychopaths are sexual psyclwpaths (within the framework of legality at
least) and that there is no provision for a
"garden variety of psychopath".
Sections follow on proof, expert and nonexpert testimony, pleadings and procedures, and
the presentation of findings to the courts of
opinions regarding sanity or insanity. The section on pleadings and procedure is particularly
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valuable as a reference since the method of
pleading, commitment, form of verdict, procedure on acquittal, and the procedure for
release are given state by state.
The section on testimony of witnesses and
their examination and cross-examination is
invaluable for the individual who might be
called upon for such testimony. Of course, any
book which attempts to encompass such a mass
of material is subject to inadvertent error of
omission on occasion-for the reason of publication lag if no other-and such is the case in
discussing privileged communication, where it
is stated that psychologists are not extended
this right legally while physicians and psychiatrists are. In at least one state; possibly more;
the converse is true. In Tennessee, psychologists
have the legal right of privileged communication while physicians do not. It is, however, a
minor point among several others throughout
the book.
On the whole, this book fills a gap in the field
of forensic psychiatry and forensic psychology,
or if it does not really fill the gap, it presents
the material in clearer and sharper fashion than
has previously been done.

A.

STANLEY WEBSTER

Knoxville--State Hospital
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGIC

MEDICINE.

By Eugene

Ziskiid, M.D. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger,
1954, 370 pp. $7.00.
This book is addressed to the general medical
practitioner and the medical specialist in fields
other than psychiatry. The author's thesis is
the integration of psychiatric knowledge to the
everyday practice of medicine. Physicians,
though recognizing this need, usually have too
little background in psychology and psychopathology.
Not that the author wishes to make psychiatrists out of physicians not attached to psychological schools! But he does feel that the physician "can diagnose and treat psychophysiologic
illness without a thorough comprehension of
the conflicting theories of psychopathology."
The author preferred "psychophysiologic" to
such terms as psychosomatic, because of the
misleading "overtones."
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The author divides his work into two portions, the first containing a manual for practitioners and the second containing materials not
so much for the purpose of evaluating what is
being done by psychiatrists, as it is to give the
non-psychiatrist physician a background and
orientation in psychiatric literature. Dr. Ziskind thinks that the "busy practitioner" may
be interested in the former rather than the latter portion, whereas the "inquisitive physician"
may find stimulating the latter portion of the
book.
What makes this book different and better
than others in'the field? Does it fill a gap? And
will the practitioner take to it? Actually, few
general practitioners have given much attention
to the emotional aspects of their patients' illness and here Dr. Ziskind is desirous of presenting a non-systematized point of view or,
as he states' to this reviewer, "free of commitment to any school of psychiatric thought,"
in which increased emphasis is given to sociocultural factors.
Needless to say, since this is not a text of
psychiatry, much of the material had to be
oversimplified and the author seems to have
been well aware of the danger in doing this.
This is particularly true when he discusses the
various schools of psychiatry. He devotes twelve
pages to Freud and "classical" psychoanalysis,
8 pages to Adler,' 6 to Jung and 5 to Rank,
whereas Homey, Sullivan, and Fromm fare,
relatively, better with 12 pages to their credit
between them, and Adolf Meyer gets a whole
chapter to himself, amounting to 5 pages. However, the author does not infer that more pages
were allotted to the Neo-Freudians than to
Freud. Actually, a good deal of material in
other chapters, such as the one on the "Mental
Mechanisms," and the chapter on "Diseases
Commonly Called Psychosomatic," deal with
Freudian theories, too. In addition, in the descriptions of all the non-Freudian schools, comparisons are made to the Freudian theories.
There are, -probably, very few places in the
literature where one can find a short comparison of the schools which highlight the fundamental theories and the concept of neuroses in
each. This book is one place where the non-

specialist can get such a comparison without
reading a whole book on the subject, especially
since most students in the fields of psychiatry
and psychology will find it impossible to read
all, or most, of the important works of each
school!
Even psychiatrists will be surprised to find an
entire chapter devoted to social factors surrounding a patient's background, The late
Professor Earle Young and his wife, Pauline
Young (whose book, Social Treatment in Probation and Delinquency, is a classic in social
sciences), assisted the author in writing this
chapter. Studies of cultural or institutional
influence are all too rare even among psychiatrists, let alone physicians. This will, indeed,
assist the readers in understanding their
patients.
The various therapies are discussed summarily, of necessity. The chapter of great value
to the non-psychiatrist is one on the differential
diagnosis of mental syndromes. This chapter
in particular should be of considerable value
to all non-psychiatrists in whatever associated
disciplines, since Dr. Ziskind finds it so even in
his training program for resident physicians
in psychiatric techniques; the aids suggested
for this deficiency should be of value to the
kindred disciplines of sociology, criminology,
and social work, who usually are lacking in this
orientation.
HAs A. ILLING
Los Angeles
STRA.YROzEss. EiN LERBUCH. By Karl Peters.
Karlsruhe: C. F. MUller, 1952. Pp. xi, 594.
DM 27.Among the post-W.W. II test books on
German Criminal Procedure which have come
to the attention of the American Student of
comparative law Professor Peters' work takes
the leading place. The author is a man who
worked for the progress of the German law even
during the years of greatest chaos in the German legal system, when many others lacked
the courage to think of tomorrow. (Werdendes
Jugendstrafrezt published 1947) Slrafprozess
reflects deep knowledge, strong convictions and
great love of the subject. Peters places the
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technical steps of pleading and procedure in
their proper sociological surroundings. Prosecutor and defendant appear as human beings, not
as mere objects of the legislator's code sections.
The intricate structure of the German Court
Constitution Law (GVG) and the Code of
Criminal Procedure (StPO) are analyzed and
presented with great clarity.-Unfortunately,
criminology as such found little mention in
this volume which is the only regrettable aspect
of the work.
GERHARD 0.

W. MUELLER
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case are excellently handled by the author. A
service is also rendered to inmates and former
inmates of Framingham through the use of
fictitious names. Last, but not least, the case is
presented in an impartial manner and highlighted by pertinent background material of
each of the main people involved in order to
point up relevant considerations.
This is a worth-while contribution to the field
of public administration and policy formation.
ARTHUR LERNER

Los Angeles, California

University of Chicago. Law.
By Thomas H. Eliot.
The Inter-University Case Program. Cases
in Public Administration and Policy Formation. ICP Case Series; Number 22. Published
and distributed for the ICP by University of
Alabama Press; University, Alabama, 1954.
Pp. 50. $0.60.
The author has done a most commendable job
in skillfully presenting a variety of involved and
detailed material in a readable manner. While
at times one may gain the impression that the
writing is becoming somewhat cumbersomethe fact remains, it is not the writing per se
which is the problem-but rather, the content
of the subject is a most perplexing and realistic
composition.
At midnight on January 11, 1949, Dr.
Miriam Van Waters was removed from a position which she had held for seventeen years by
the State Commissioner of Correction. Dr. Van
Waters was (and still is) the Superintendent of
the Reformatory for Women at Framingham,
Massachusetts.
Claiming her right to a hearing before a
special impartial commission appointed by the
Governor of Massachusetts, Dr. Van Waters
waited for the final decision to be made. On
March 12, 1949 she was reinstated to her position. The commission found that some of
Commissioner McDowell's charges were not
substantiated and that the remainder, even if
true, did not constitute just cause for Dr. Van
Water's removal.
The public interest, the psychology of the
people involved and the dynamics of the entire
THE VAN WATERS CASE.

CLASSIC CRImES. By William Roughead. London, Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1951. Pp.
449, preface. $4.00.
No writer of fiction could desire more fascinating and unprincipled characters than the
late William Roughead has taken from an almost two hundred year romance of British
roguery. As the Scottish playwright, the late
James Bridie, says in his preface to Classic
Crimes, Roughead is a "student of the bad,"
regarding with an almost affectionate patrimonial interest the careers of those real-life
British criminals who would be "nane the waur
o'a hangin'."
Since truth is stranger than fiction, some of
Roughead's twelve profiles seem all but incredible in the reading, however much the teller of
the tales has underplayed his stories for the
aficimados of old crimes. Few whodunit carpenters can match Roughead's chapter on the
Ardlamont Mystery or the Bravo poisoning
case; few psycho-thrillers can top the sheer
factual horror of the ghoulish West Port Murders or the strange riddle of Constance Kent;
and Hollywood itself would be hard put to invent the sagas of the bold Deacon Brodie and
the arrogant Dr. Pritchard. Nothing of unpleasant dullness or pedantry clings to the derringdo, local color, and attractive authenticity of
such prize puzzles of British criminal jurisprudence as the cases of Oscar Slater, Jessie
M'Lachlan, and John Donald Merrett.
In his introduction to the episode of the impassioned Madeleine Smith and the mystery
of Blythewood Square, William Roughead offers the opinion that "one cannot have too much
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of a good murder." If the judicial drama were
unfolded by the fluid pen of the late Mr.
Roughead, this reviewer would be in emphatic
agreement with the statement.
HAuoD M. HEn.rmmN
Air Research and Development Command
Baltimore, Maryland
TnE PsYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIINAL Acv AND
PuNisrmNT.

By Gregory Zilboorg, M.D.

Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York,
1954, 141 pp. $3.50.
This book is the second in a series of publications growing out of the annual Isaac Ray
Awards for the most valuable "contribution to
the improvement of the relations of Law and
Psychiatry," (The first, previously reviewed
here, was also published by Harcourt, Brace
and Company: THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE
LAW by Winfred Overholser, M.D.)
To this reviewer, Dr. Zilboorg's contribution
is a valuable one, even if the title is ill chosen.
For what the author actually examines are the
differences and similarities between criminal
law and medical psychology and, moreover, why
the differences exist and, better, should not
exist. One of the finest chapters, concise and
hitting the nail on the head, is the third on
"Some Differences in Professional Psychology,"
which should be required reading for every
judge, attorney, and criminologist. True, the
author sees things from the psychiatrist's point
of view in calling attention to the continuing
serious shortcomings in the legal student's
training, but his points seem well taken; one
especially: all professions dealing with people
are training their students to handle people
while in training, except the legal, whose
student is buried in books instead of visiting
jails, taking case histories and comparing them
with the court and probation officers' records,
etc. Dr. Zilboorg feels that, while the jurist
should not become a psychologist in his own
right, he should, on the other hand, not attempt
"to combat and eliminate people as if he (the
lawyer) were the sanitary tool of some supersociological housecleaning department." On
the contrary, people should be disposed in such
a manner that they "would be preserved and

rehabilitated in their totality." Zr. Zilboorg
constantly counsels both parties, the jurists
and the psychiatrists, to hold that every
criminal is ill and every crime the result of
psychological pathology. However, the point
he wishes to drive home is that every profession has its psychology and, while the lawyer
or the doctor has his foci which often tend to
"tinge his social hostility," the hostility between the professions of jurisprudence and
psychiatry could be decreased considerably, if
"both the lawyer and the psychiatrist could
meet at the crossroads and make the crossroads
common ground."
Other important chapters are the ones on
"Aggression and Transgression" and "Some
Sources of the Drive to Punish." Especially in
the latter, Dr. Zilboorg deplores the fact that
"a present-day criminal trial is not an investigation after truth but an adversary proceeding;
in other words, it is a fight between adversaries
each of whom is actuated only by the personal
desire to win." The "drive to punish," then, is
directed toward an accused who is an "adversary" as well. Few will dispute the author's
thesis and, so it seems to this review, even
fewer may lend a hand to correct this age-old
problem, already visible in Biblical and, later,
in the Roman courts!
Dr. Zilboorg does not prescribe a remedy.
Perhaps there is none, save every individual's
effort to work toward a "common ground."
One thing seems to be certain, that we need
books of this kind badly and we need more of
them: short and concise and pulling no punches.
With the help of such books the audience will
grow in size and eventually will bring about
needed improvement in our legal proceedings
and in the law.
HANs A. ILLING
Los Angeles

HEREsY, YEs-CoNsPnzAcY, No. By Sidney
Hook. John Day Co., 1953, 278 pp., $3.75.
"Heresy" deserves to be read by all who are
seriously interested in our civil liberties. It will
also stimulate a passion for sharp and logical
discussion.
In Professor Hook's view, we are threatened
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by two groups, the "cultural vigilantes," and
the "ritualistic liberals," Hook stating that
"both groups flourish on each other's misapprehension and their outcries have drowned out
the voice of intelligence." The "voice of intelligence" is supplied ably by the author.
HANS A. ILLING
Los Angeles
Tm

CAUSES AND TREATMENT OF BACKWARD-

N-Ess. By Sir Cyril Burt. Philosophical Library, Publisher, New York. 1953. Pp. 128.
$3.75.
This book, a revision, addition, and abridgement of the author's 1938 work-The Backward
Child-is intended as a "practical rather than
theoretical" consideration of the problems surrounding the inability of children to progress
at the usual speed through school. The revision
was designed for "the ordinary teacher".
Following a history of child study the
author's methods of investigation are applied
in turn to the environmental, physical, intellectual, emotional, and moral factors influencing
"backwardness". It is at the very beginning of
the historical summary that doubt begins to
creep in as to the applicability of this book to a
teacher population in this country. Unless there
is a wide difference in teacher training between
the two countries, it seems unlikely that there
is sufficient theoretical background in our own
teacher population to cope with the Hippocratic
school, the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration, or Kretschmerian body types. Aside from
this point, and the fact that the history cited is
entirely English, further doubt arises concerning the differences between Commonwealth and
United States populations of children. For
example, hypermetropia (far-sightedness) is
cited as a cause of backwardness-a very serious
one and "far more important than ordinary
short sight". This is certainly not the case in
this country where myopia is by far the more
serious, and in fact, hypermetropia is normal
and usual; and not expected to be a cause of
symptomatology other than in extremely severe
cases. These cases, however, are apparently as
rare as diphtheria has now become. It is difficult
to account for the differences between a population where hypermetropia is normal in children,
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and one where it is not. The further one goes
in the book, the more marked do the differences
appear to be between the populations.
More positively speaking there are excellent
sections devoted to method of teacher-treatment of backwardness, viz., the means by which
lefthandedness may be corrected. It is, however,
most questionable as to whether such methods
should be undertaken by teachers, if indeed
there is any need for changing at all-from the
standpoint of propriety as well as that of
legality.
The point must be emphasized again, and
finally, that cultural differences between the two
English-speaking populations make the methods advocated in this book questionable as to
their application in this country. That there are
some excellent methods cited cannot be
doubted, but the differences already mentioned
seem to vitiate their application in this country
by teachers who use this book.
A. STANLEY WEBSTER
Knoxville, Tenn.
BREAx DOWN THE WALLS. By John Bartlow

Martin. Ballantine Books, 1954. Pp. $3.50
(hard) 0.50 (paper)
The author has tried to appraise the theories
of crime and the criminal. But much more interesting are his 200 pages in which he discusses
the prison system. What are we to do about it
now that it has failed to do what we have
wanted it to do. A respective volume of our
prison population, he believes, must be isolated
from the general population. We needn't think
we are through with prisons. But their population could be reduced, he believes, by 50 percent-advantageously to the prisoners and to
all others concerned.
On pages 279 and 280 the author sets out his
legislative program as follows;
1. To provide more and better paid parole
and probation workers.
2. Money for numerous prison farms and
camps, and for a few medium security institutions.
3. Provide for razing our great maximum
security prisons and substituting small institutions for them.

